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We consider seings in which we wish to incentivize myopic agents (such as Airbnb landlords, who may
emphasize short-term prots and property safety) to treat arriving clients fairly, in order to prevent overall
discrimination against individuals or groups. We model such seings in both classical and contextual bandit
models in which the myopic agents maximize rewards according to current empirical averages, but are also
amenable to exogenous payments that may cause them to alter their choices. Our notion of fairness asks that
more qualied individuals are never (probabilistically) preferred over less qualied ones [Joseph et al., 2016a].
We investigate whether it is possible to design inexpensive subsidy or payment schemes for a principal to
motivate myopic agents to play fairly in all or almost all rounds. When the principal has full information about
the state of the myopic agents, we show it is possible to induce fair play on every round with a subsidy scheme
of total cost o(T ) (for the classic seing with k arms, O˜ (
√
k3T ), and for the d-dimensional linear contextual
seing O˜ (d
√
k3T )). If the principal has much more limited information (as might oen be the case for an
external regulator or watchdog), and only observes the number of rounds in which members from each of the
k groups were selected, but not the empirical estimates maintained by the myopic agent, the design of such a
scheme becomes more complex. We show both positive and negative results in the classic and linear bandit
seings by upper and lower bounding the cost of fair subsidy schemes.
1 INTRODUCTION
Recent uses of machine learning to make decisions of consequence for individual citizens (such as
credit, employment and criminal sentencing) have led to concerns about the potential for these
techniques to be discriminatory or unfair ([Barocas and Selbst, 2016], [Coglianese and Lehr, 2016],
[Brill, 2015]). Existing research has emphasized discriminatory outcomes originating from biases
encoded into the data sets on which algorithms are trained.1 In this paper, we consider a dierent
source of unfairness in a stochastic bandit seing. e key friction we examine is when a forward-
looking principal concerned with fairness (such as a regulator or technology platform) is not the
one directly making the choices. Instead, a sequence of myopic agents are making the choices.
To prevent unfair choices by these agents, the principal may oer targeted monetary rewards to
agents to incentivize them to make dierent choices than they would have in the absence of such
payments. Our concern in this paper is how much the principal needs to be prepared to pay in
order to incentivize fair decisions by myopic agents.
To help x ideas and motivate our problem, consider a challenge faced by peer-to-peer (P2P)
platforms such as Prosper (P2P lending) or Airbnb (P2P short-stay housing). e platform cannot
dictate to their users who to extend loans or rent to. Nevertheless, it may wish to ensure the choices
its users make are fair, either to avoid criticism,2 or to comply with existing regulations. P2P
lending, for example, is subject to the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA). One provision of the
Act is a requirement that lenders furnish reasons for adverse lending decisions. is obligation falls
1 For example, Boston’s Street Bump program, which uses smartphones to determine where road repairs are needed, results
in certain areas being underserved because of the sparsity of smartphones traversing them ([O’Leary, 2013]).
2 Airbnb has very recently received scrutiny over both anecdotal reports and systematic studies of racist behavior by
landlords on their platform ([Edelman et al., 2016]). is study also suggests that myopia may play a role in discrimination,
in the sense that landlords with no prior exposure to minority renters were more likely to discriminate.
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on the shoulders of the platform, and is challenging to discharge because the platform aggregates
the decisions of many dierent lenders.3
In our model, an agent arrives at each period and must choose amongst a set of available
alternatives. (For instance, the agent might be a lender on Prosper choosing to whom they will
grant a loan, or an Airbnb host choosing which guest to accept.) We model this as a choice of
which arm to pull in a stochastic bandit seing. We consider both the classic and contextual bandit
cases. In the classic seing, each arm represents an individual, who will over time repeatedly
be considered for service. In the contextual seing, each arm represents a group, and individual
members of that group are represented by contexts (i.e. sets of individual features) which change
at each round. A stochastic reward from the pull of an arm models the uncertain payo associated
with serving an individual (i.e. extending a loan, or having the individual rent). Each agent is
myopic in the sense that they are an occasional user of this platform, and thus care only about their
current expected payo. Because of myopia, the agent chooses the arm with the highest empirical
mean in the classical case, and the context with the highest predicted reward according to a xed
one-shot learning procedure known to the principal (e.g. ordinary least squares regression, or ridge
regression). Each agent is limited to pulling a single arm to model their limited resources (e.g.,
they may only have the funds to grant one loan, or host one guest on any particular night), and of
course this simplies our analysis.
e platform, motivated by a need for “accountability,” would like to be fair. Our formal denition
of fairness (Joseph et al. [2016a]) may be found in Section 2, and can be informally described as
follows: Suppose an auditor knew the expected reward of each arm (or more generally, in the
contextual case, of each context), and looked back at the platform’s decisions. Fairness requires that
a worse individual was never favored over a beer individual. More precisely, if a platform is fair,
then on any day t , the probability px that the agent pulls arm x is such that if the expected reward
of x is at least that of x ′, then px ≥ px ′ . Fairness as dened in this paper does not address inequities
“outside the model”. For example, if one group has lower expected payo for every context than
another, perhaps due to historical inequities, and there are no additional features available to the
learning algorithm, our notion of fairness permits the agent to favor the higher expected group. In
this sense our fairness notion is aligned with (apparent) meritocracy.
Intuitively, there are two impediments to fairness in this model. First, neither the platform nor
the agents know the distribution of rewards of each arm. If these were known, the problem would
be trivial: it would be both fair and agent-optimal to always pull the arm with highest expected
reward. Second, the agents are myopic — they have no incentive to directly invest in fairness or
learning.
We examine whether it is possible for the platform, hereaer called the principal, to incentivize
the agents to make fair choices by oering the agent payments for selecting particular arms.
ese payments can be randomized. Because the agents behave identically in our model (they
are all myopic), we treat them as if they are a single myopic entity, whom we term the agent. We
investigate how much information a principal needs to incentivize fair behavior. Characterizing the
information requirements is important, since sometimes the principal may be an external regulator
or other entity tasked with oversight without the full information available to the platform. At one
extreme, called partial information, we suppose the principal observes only which decisions were
made by the agent in each of the previous rounds but not the rewards. In the P2P context, rewards
might be unobservable because the reward an agent experiences is a function of both observed
3Lenders on Prosper must agree to comply with the relevant provisions of the ECOA, but there is still evidence of
discrimination; see [Pope and Snyder, 2011].
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Full Information Partial Information
Classical O˜ (
√
k3T ) cost O (
√
T ) cost for k = 2
Ω(T ) cost for k ≥ 3
O˜ (
√
k3T ) cost allowing O˜ (k2) unfair rounds
Linear Contextual O˜ (d
√
k3T ) cost o(T ) unfair rounds→ Ω(T ) cost
o(T ) cost→ Ω(T ) unfair rounds
Table 1. Summary of cost to incentivize perfect fairness and fairness in all but a limited number of rounds.
characteristics of the borrower or renter and a private type of the agent. At the other extreme of
full information, the principal has the same information as the agent.
We ask each of these questions in both the classic and linear contextual bandits seings. In the
classic case, individual i is beer than individual j if the mean of distribution i is higher than that
of distribution j. In the contextual case, individual i on day t is represented by a set of features, or
a context x ti , and that individual’s expected reward is dened as fi (x ti ) for some fi ∈ C .
1.1 Our Results
Table 1 summarizes our results for characterizing the cost of incentivizing fair play in myopic
agents. Informally, we show a stark separation: in the partial information model, any fair payment
scheme must cost Ω(T ); while in the full information model there are payment schemes which cost
O˜ (d
√
k3T ). In both the classic and contextual seings, the full information upper bounds eectively
incentivize the agent to play known fair algorithms. e lower bounds for the partial information
model look somewhat dierent. For the classic seing, our lower bound simply shows that the rst
round at which the principal doesn’t oer a payment of 1 will be unfair with constant probability;
for the contextual seing, every round must either be unfair or oer Ω(1) payment.
We additionally show that in partial information model, the classic problem is somewhat easier
in two cases. When there are only 2 arms, we give a simple payment scheme that only incurs a
cost of O (
√
T ) and guarantees with high probability that the agent is fair at every round. Even
when k ≥ 3, a principal who is allowed O˜ (k2) unfair rounds can design a payment scheme which
costs only O˜ (
√
k3T ).4 In the full information model, we exhibit a payment scheme for the principal
which, with high probability, is fair in every round, and has cost O˜ (
√
k3T ).
It is interesting to observe that all our payment schemes that guarantee fairness (either in each
period, or except at a constant number of periods) and achieve sublinear costs also induce the agent
to play so as to experience sublinear regret. If we think of sub-linear regret as a proxy for eciency,
our full information results say we can achieve both eciency and fairness with subsides that grow
slowly over time. Under certain conditions, this is also possible in the partial information seing,
which does not require the principal to “open the books” of the agent.
1.2 Related Work
Our work is closely related to the literature on incentivizing experimentation in bandit seings.
In these papers, a sequence of agents arrives one at a time and each is allowed to select an arm
to pull. Each agent “lives” for one period and therefore pulls the arm that has the highest current
estimated payo given the history. e agents’ myopia means that they do not explore suciently
and the patient principal must encourage it.
4In other words, we show that by allowing a constant number of unfair rounds, independent of T , one can achieve sublinear
costs.
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In this context, Frazier et al. [2014] explore the achievable set between the monetary rewards
the principal must pay to incentivize exploration and the time discounted expected reward to the
principal. In this paper the history of actions and outcomes is observed by the principal and there
is, therefore, no examination of what happens with limited information. More importantly, there is
no consideration of fairness, which is our primary interest.
A dierent string of papers does not explicitly allow for monetary payments, but instead allows
the principal to choose the information that future agents see about past agents’ realized rewards,
see e.g. Kremer et al. [2014], a more general exploration by some of the same authors in Mansour
et al. [2015], or an analytical solution in a continous time Poisson bandit seing by Che and Horner
[2015] and the same in a discrete time seing in Papanastasiou et al. [2017]. e key point of
departure for our work is that for us, the principal is not explicitly interested in the long term
reward of the agent, but is instead interested in promoting “fairness” (although this will incidentally
have the property of increasing long-term reward of the agent by encouraging experimentation).
Joseph et al. [2016a] originally proposed our denition of contextual fairness. ey consider
the tradeos between requiring this form of fairness and achieving no-regret in both classic and
contextual bandit seings. is notion was also employed in Joseph et al. [2016b], when specialized
to the linear contextual bandits case.
2 PRELIMINARIES
A principal faces a sequence of homogeneous myopic agents, each operating in a contextual bandit
seing. For simplicity, we view the agents as a single agent repeatedly making myopic choices.
2.1 Contextual Bandits
Let {k } refer to a set of arms. In each round t ∈ [T ], an adversary reveals to the agent a context
x tj ∈ X, where X is the common domain of contexts, for each arm j ∈ [k].
Fix some class C of functions of the form f : X → [0, 1]. Associated with each arm j is a
function fj ∈ C , unknown to both the agent and the principal.5. An agent who chooses an arm j in
period t with context is x tj receives a stochastic reward r tj ∼ F
x tj
j , where E[r tj ] = fj (x tj ), for some
distribution F x
t
j
j over [0, 1].
Remark 1 (Linear Contextual Bandits). e results in this paper which involve contexts are for
the case where the set of contexts X = {x ∈ [0, 1]d : | |x | | ≤ 1} for some number d > 0, and
C = { fj : there exists some θ j ∈ [0, 1]d , | |θ j | | ≤ 1, s.t. fj (x j ) = 〈θ j ,x j 〉, ∀x j ∈ X}.
Remark 2 (Classic Bandits). e classic bandits problem is a special case of the contextual bandits
problem where the set of possible contexts is a singleton. en F ·j = Fj and r tj ∼ Fj .
In the running example of P2P lending, X represents possible proles of aributes that a lender
can observe about a potential borrower. e exact relationship between a prole of aributes at
time t , denoted x tj , and the expected reward earned from extending a loan to a borrower with this
prole is fj (x tj ); this functional form is unknown to the lender, the platform, and the agent.
2.2 The Myopic Agent and the Principal
In each period t , the principal can oer a vector of payments pt ∈ <k+ to the agent. Here pti is to be
interpreted as the monetary incentive the agent receives from the principal if they selects arm i on
top of any reward that would accrue from the arm itself.
5Oen, the contextual bandit problem is dened so that there is a single function f associated with all of the arms. Our
model is only more general.
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We assume the agent makes myopic choices facing empirical estimates of the reward from each
arm (we describe how these empirical estimates are constructed momentarily). We use µˆti to denote
the empirical estimated reward for selecting arm i in round t . When the agent receives a proposed
subsidy vector pt ∼ γ t (·), they choose the arm which maximizes the sum of empirical expected
reward and payment, i.e. chooses it ∈ argmaxi (µˆti + pti ). is is the sense in which the agent is
myopic—they maximize (their estimate of) today’s net reward plus payment, with no concern for
the future. Note that we assume that rewards are expressed in monetary terms, i.e. that they are
directly comparable to oered payments.
For concreteness and without loss of generality, we x a tie-breaking rule—ifM = argmaxi (µˆti +
pti ) contains multiple elements, the agent chooses uniformly at random amongst the members of
M that also maximize payment, i.e. from the set argmaxi ∈M pti .6 e principal experiences cost
pti t at round t , and total cost
∑T
t=1 p
t
i t over the course of T rounds. e payments oered by the
principal, and the empirical estimates of the agent, depend on what they know about past choices
and outcomes. We dene these next.
2.3 Information and Histories
e agent will, in any period t , recall history ht ∈
(
Xk ×<k+ × [k] × [0, 1]
)t−1
= H t . is is a
record of the previous t − 1 rounds experienced by the agent: t − 1 4-tuples encoding the realization
of the contexts for each arm in a given period, the payments the principal oered, the arm chosen,
and the realized reward observed.
In the linear contextual case, let θˆ ti represent an estimate of the linear model θi based on the
history ht (this could, for example, be the ordinary least-squares or regularized ridge regression
estimator — the important thing is that whichever method is used is known to the principal). e
myopic decision maker, at day t , when facing contexts x t1 , . . . ,x tk will have empirical estimated
reward µˆti = 〈θˆ ti ,x ti 〉. In the classic seing, µˆti =
∑
t ′<t r t
′
i
| {t ′<t : i played in round t ′ } | , that is, it represents the
empirical average for the set of previous rewards observed from arm i in previous rounds.
Note that during the rst several rounds, the myopic reward estimates µˆti are not necessarily
dened, e.g. if in the classic seing, the agent has not yet observed any rewards from arm i , or if
in the linear contextual case, the agent has not observed suciently many reward/context pairs
to uniquely dene the OLS estimator. To get around this issue, we assume that the agent has
previously observed suciently many observations from each arm to make these estimates well
dened — i.e. at least one observation per arm in the classic case, and observations corresponding
to contexts that combined form a full rank matrix in the linear case.
We consider two information models for the principal. In the full informationmodel, the principal
observes everything the agent observes, i.e. there is no information asymmetry between the two. In
the partial information model, the principal observes neither the contexts faced by the agents, nor
the realized reward of the arm the agent pulled. We will denote this by ht ∈
(
<k+ × [k]
)t−1
= H t .
e principal’s information scheme is a function of the information they have.
In what follows, we dene various notions of performance of algorithm. is is without loss: the
payments that the principal oers, and the resulting choices made by the agents choices, taken
together, can be thought of as an algorithm making choices in a stochastic bandit seing.
6Our results do not depend in any important way on the particulars of the tie-breaking rule—we chose this one to simplify
parts of the lower bound proof.
Sampath Kannan, Michael Kearns, Jamie Morgenstern, Mallesh Pai, Aaron Roth, Rakesh Vohra, and Z. Steven Wu 6
2.4 Fairness and Regret
A standard method for measuring the performance of a bandit algorithm is to measure its regret.
If one knew { fj }j ∈[k], selecting the arm with highest expected reward in each period would be
optimal. Fix an algorithm A and let pi t be the distribution over arms at round t of the algorithm:
the regret of A is the dierence between the reward of the optimal policy, and the reward of the
agent:
Regret(x1, . . . ,xT ) =
∑
t
max
j
(
fj (x
t
j )
)
− Ei t∼pi t [
∑
t
fi t (x
t
i t )].
We say that A satises regret bound R (T ), if maxx 1, ...,xT Regret(x1, . . . ,xT ) ≤ R (T ).
We denote by pi tj |ht the probability that A chooses arm j aer observing contexts x t in period t ,
given ht . For economy, we will oen drop the superscript t on the history when referring to the
distribution over arms: pi tj |h B pi
t
j |ht .
We now dene what it means for an algorithm A to be fair in a particular round t . Informally,
this will mean that A will play arm i with higher probability than arm j in round t only if i has
higher true expected reward than j in round t .
Denition 2.1 (Round Fairness). Fix some history ht . Recall pi tj |ht is the probability that A plays
arm j in round t given the history ht . We will say A is fair in round t if, for any context x t , for all
pairs of arms j, j ′ ∈ [k],
pi tj |h > pi
t
j′ |h only if fj (x
t
j ) > fj′ (x
t
j′ ).
Similarly, a payment scheme is fair in round t if the selection by the myopic agent under the
payment distribution is fair.
Remark 3. When this denition is specialized to the classic (noncontextual) case, the reward
distributions do not vary with time, i.e. F tj = Fj for all t . us, “noncontextual” fairness reduces to
guaranteeing that if arm i is played with higher probability than arm j, it must be that the average
reward drawn from distribution Fi is higher than the average reward drawn from distribution Fj .
Remark 4. To be clear about this denition in the partial information model, and what we mean
by probabilities: note that the “algorithm” has access to ht at the beginning of time t . By this
we mean that, the principal has access to ht . e principal then oers payments to the agent,
possibly randomizing. e agent sees the full history ht , and the realized payments drawn from
a distribution, and makes a choice. e principal’s randomization, and then, if there are ties, the
agent’s randomization in period t , can be amalgamated into a net probability of each arm being
selected in period t aer history ht . ese are the pi ’s that the denition refers to.
We now introduce a notion of fairness which holds at every round with high probability over
the history of observed rewards.
Denition 2.2 (Contextual Fairness). A (·) is fair if, for any input δ ∈ (0, 1), for all sequences of
contexts, x1, . . . ,x t and all reward distributions F t1 , . . . ,F tk , with probability at least 1 − δ over
the realization of the history h, for all rounds t ∈ [T ], A (δ ) is fair in round t .
Contextual fairness, introduced in Joseph et al. [2016a], formalizes the idea that highly qualied
individuals should be treated at least as well as less qualied individuals. Here, an individual’s
qualication is measured in terms of their expected reward for A. If two individuals have dierent
proles (or contexts) but generate the same expected reward to the learner, this denition enforces
that both be played with equal probability every round. We also introduce a relaxation of contextual
fairness, which allows for an algorithm to have some number of unfair rounds.
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Denition 2.3 (д-Contextual Fairness). A (δ ) is д-fair if, for any input δ ∈ (0, 1), for all sequences
of contexts, and all reward distributions, with probability at least 1 − δ over the realization of the
history h, for all but д rounds t ∈ [T ], A (δ ) is fair in round t .
Our principal is willing to incentivize the agent’s behavior to ensure contextual fairness (and,
incidentally, low regret). We investigate what subsidy schemes incentivize fair choices by a myopic
agent, and the cumulative cost of such subsidies. We show this answer depends upon the kind
of information the principal has access to: incentivizing fair play with partial information is in
general very expensive, while incentivizing fair play under full information need not be so.
3 A PRINCIPAL WITH PARTIAL INFORMATION CANNOT ENSURE T FAIR ROUNDS
In this section, we give a lower bound on the total payments needed in the partial information
seing to ensure contextual fairness in every round. In fact, we don’t even need to move to the
contextual case: this section focuses on the classic bandit seing (where the context x tj is invariant
with respect to t for each arm j). We show that in the partial information seing, any principal who
incentivizes a myopic agent to satisfy contextual fairness in each round must incentivize uniformly
random play in each of the T rounds, which has cumulative cost Ω(T ).
Theorem 3.1. Suppose k ≥ 3. ere is an instance such that any fair payment scheme in the partial
information model must, with probability 1 − δ , (where δ is the fairness parameter passed to the
principal) spend Ω(T ) in payments over T rounds and incur regret Ω(T ).
e lower bound proceeds from the following idea: at the rst round, the principal has no
information about what the instance is. Hence, in order to guarantee fairness against all instances,
they must proceed cautiously and use a payment scheme that is able to induce uniformly random
play (the only distribution that is fair for all instances) for every possible realization of empirical
means. Because empirical means can range between 0 and 1, this will cost 1. However, because this
payment distribution (by design) induces identical behavior on every possible instance, it does not
allow the principal to learn anything about the instance. us, in every round before which fair
play has been guaranteed, the principal has the same informational disadvantage. By induction,
therefore, they must induce uniformly random play at every round, at a cost of 1 per round.
We show that fairness at every round, against all instances is equivalent to the payment scheme
in each round being what we term peaked. A peaked payment rule is one that can always incentivize
the play of some arm regardless of the empirical means the myopic agent currently has. is is
equivalent to saying that there is some arm i ∈ [k] for which pi ≥ pi′ + 1 for all i ′ , i . is will
imply the payment scheme must spend Ω(1) in each round to incentivize fair play, or Ω(T ) in total.
Denition 3.2 (Peaked). Let p ∈ Rk . If for some i ∈ [k], pi ≥ maxi′,i pi′ + 1, we say p is peaked. If
Pp∼D[p is peaked] = 1
then we call distribution D peaked.
Observation 1. If a principal uses a peaked distribution D in a round, they learn nothing about the
instance the agent faces from the agent’s play in that round.
Proof. By Denition 3.2, every payment scheme drawn from D is peaked. In other words, for
every p` ∼ D: there is some i` such that pi` ≥ maxi′,i` pi′ + 1. us, the myopic agent will choose
i` when presented with p` regardless of the instance the agent faces. 
e main idea behind eorem 3.1 is in proving that any fair payment scheme must be peaked
in every round. Technically, we use the fact that the principal learns nothing about the instance
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from a peaked distribution to allow us freedom to design a lower bound instance as a function of
the rst distribution Dt deployed by the principal that is not peaked. Because this distribution, by
virtue of being the rst non-peaked distribution, cannot be a function of the underlying instance,
we are unconstrained in our ability to tailor the instance as a function of Dt . We then show this
instance forces an unfair round for Dt ; we can conclude that with probability 1 − δ , the principal
must never deploy any distribution over payments that is not peaked.
Lemma 3.3. For any fairness parameter δ , a fair payment scheme must with probability 1 − δ
generate a sequence of payment distributions D1, . . . ,DT such that each Dt is peaked.
We now conclude the proof of eorem 3.1 before presenting the proof of Lemma 3.3.
Proof. Lemma 3.3 implies that a fair payment scheme must with probability 1 − δ generate T
peaked payment distributions. Since maxi pi ≥ maxj,i pj + 1, and µˆti ∈ [0, 1] for all i , the payment
scheme’s largest payment is always at least 1, and is always accepted. us, the myopic agent will
receive a payment of at least 1 in every round, for a total cost of Ω(T ).
To prove the regret of this payment scheme may be Ω(T ) on some instances, consider each of the
k instances in which one arm has mean 1 and the remaining k−1 arms have mean 0. By Observation
1, the principal has no information about which of these instances is realized. erefore to be to
be fair with respect to all of these instances, each arm must be assigned the largest payment with
equal probability, which induces uniformly random play amongst all k arms, Ω(1) regret per round,
and cumulative regret Ω(T ). 
We now present the proof of the main lemma for this section: that in order for a payment
distribution to be fair, it must be peaked. Informally, we rst show that any fair payment distribution
must be “invariant under permutation”: any coordinate i should have have an equal probability of
having the largest payment, and have an equal probability of j being the second-largest payment
with margin c , for each value of j and c . We then show in the rst round t at which the payment
distribution is unpeaked, Dt is unfair for some instance I constructed as a function of Dt .
Proof of Lemma 3.3. We consider some round t . Suppose that for every round t ′ < t , the
payment distribution Dt ′ was peaked. If the payment distribution Dt = D at round t is fair, we
show that it too must be peaked. Observe that by Observation 1, D must be dened independently
of the underlying instance I , and because fairness is dened in the worst case over instances, we
continue to have complete freedom in choosing I .
We rst claim that in round t , if D is fair, for any two distinct i, i ′, ∈ [k] and any c ∈ [0, 1], that
Pp∼D[pi ≥ max
`∈[k], `,i
p` + c] = Pp∼D[p ′i ≥ max
`∈[k], `,i′
p` + c]. (1)
Suppose Equation 1 does not hold. We construct an instance for which D will not be fair, a
contradiction. Suppose the le-hand side is larger than the right-hand side. Consider an instance
where µi = µi′ = 1 − c , and all other arms (of which there is at least 1) have means µ j = 1. Suppose
further that the distribution over i’s reward is deterministic point mass at 1− c , whereas i ′’s reward
distribution yields reward 1 − c + ϵ with probability 12 and 1 − c − ϵ with probability 12 . en, with
probability at least 14 , µˆi′ < µˆi .
7 us, with probability 14 over the history of rewards observed, i
wins with higher probability than i ′, since i wins whenever i’s payment is the largest by c , and i ′
can only win when i ′’s payment is the largest by at least c for any history for which µˆi′ < µi′ . is
is a violation to fairness for δ < 14 .
7For t odd it is 12 , for even t it is
1
2
(
1 − ·
(
t
t /2
))
· 12t ≥ 14 , achieved at t = 2 and increasing in t .
Sampath Kannan, Michael Kearns, Jamie Morgenstern, Mallesh Pai, Aaron Roth, Rakesh Vohra, and Z. Steven Wu 9
Notice that Equation 1 implies that each arm receives the highest payment with probability 1k ,
and that this also holds conditioning on any gap c between highest and second-highest payments.
Now, since D is not peaked,
Pp∼D[∃i : pi ≥ max
i′,i
pi′ + 1] < 1.
Dene c as follows:
c = sup
y≥0
s.t. Pp∼D[∃i : pi ≥ max
i′,i
pi′ + y] = 1.
Notice, this implies that:
∀ϵ > 0,∃η > 0 s.t. Pp∼D[∃i : pi ≥ max
i′,i
pi′ + c + ϵ] ≤ 1 − η. (2)
We now construct an instance as a function of c . ere are two cases – either c > 0 or c = 0.
Case 1: c > 0. Consider the following instance, dened in terms of c and a constant 0 < ϵ < c:
arm 1 has mean 1 − c with deterministic rewards, arm 2 has mean 1 − c with reward 1 − c − ϵ with
probability 12 and reward 1−c +ϵ with probability 12 , and arms 3, . . . ,k have a deterministic reward
of 1. Note that by denition of c , and the deterministic nature of arm 1’s distribution, we have that
for every history h, pi t1 |h ≥ 1/k . By the fairness constraint, we must therefore also have that for
every other arm i > 1, pi ti |h ≥ 1/k , since no other arm has lower mean. is implies that for every
arm i , it must be that pi ti |h = 1/k .
Note, as we argued in footnote 7, that with probability at least 14 , for any t , µˆ2 < µˆ1 = 1 − c ,
by construction. In this case, there is some ϵ ′ > 0 such that arm 2 is not played unless p2 >
maxi,2 pi + c + ϵ ′. However, by denition of c , this occurs with probability strictly less than 1/k ,
contradicting the assertion that D is a fair distribution.
Case 2: c = 0. Consider the instance in which arms 1, . . . ,k − 1 have mean 12 and deterministic
reward distributions, while armk hasmean 1/2, and stochastic rewards that are 12−ϵ with probability
1
2 and
1
2 + ϵ with probability
1
2 . Note that in this case, fairness requires that all arms be played
with identical probabilities. With probability at least 14 , arm k has empirical mean lower than its
true mean. Condition on µˆk < µk . In this case, since c = 0, with arm k must be selected with
probability less than 1k since the payment to arm k will be strictly less than µk − µˆk with strictly
positive probability (2), and therefore unfair. 
3.1 A fair payment scheme for two arms
We now show that having at least three arms is necessary for our lower bound result. Indeed, in the
classic stochastic partial information seing with two arms there exists a simple payment scheme
that can ensure fairness in every round while achieving sublinear regret and payment.
e key idea in this payment scheme is to maintain condence intervals around empirical reward
means for the two arms. e following lemma tells us how to construct condence intervals.
Lemma 3.4 (Lemma 1, [Joseph et al., 2016a]). Suppose arm i has been pulled nti times before
round t . Let `ti = µˆ
t
i −
√
ln (pi (t+1))
2
3δ
2nti
, and uti = µˆ
t
i +
√
ln (pi (t+1))
2
3δ
2nti
. en, with probability at least 1 − δ ,
for every i ∈ [k], t ∈ [T ], `ti ≤ µi ≤ uti .
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In the light of this result, we will dene the function ConfidenceWidth as follows, which will
also be useful for describing our payment scheme in the following section.
ConfidenceWidth(δ , t ,n) = 2
√
ln
(
(pi ·(t+1))2
3δ
)
n
(3)
Given this condence width function, our payment scheme is the following: in each round t , choose
an arm at uniformly at random, and oer payment p (δ , t ,nt1,nt2) for playing arm at and oer 0 for
playing the other arm, where
p (δ , t ,nt1,n
t
2) = ConfidenceWidth(δ , t ,nt1) + ConfidenceWidth(δ , t ,nt2)
and nt1,nt2 denote the number of times that the two arms are played before round t . Whenever the
agent selects the arm associated with zero payment, the principal will then oer zero payment for
both arms in all future rounds.
Theorem 3.5. Consider the classic case with k = 2 arms in the partial information seing. en
the payment scheme above instantiated with parameter δ is fair in every round with probability at
least 1 − δ . Moreover, the incurred total cost and expected regret are at most O˜ (√T ).
4 CLASSIC SETTING: SUBLINEAR PAYMENTS WITH ONLY O˜ (K2) UNFAIR ROUNDS
e necessity of linear growth in subsidies (eorem 3.1) was driven by the requirement that the
agent satisfy contextual fairness in each period. It is natural to ask what would happen if one
relaxed this requirement. In this section, we describe how to design a payment scheme which will
satisfy contextual fairness in all but O˜ (k2) rounds. We show that it is possible to achieve payments
and regret which grow sub-linearly with T .
e rough idea behind this upper bound is inspired by Joseph et al. [2016a] who show that
fairness can be achieved by maintaining condence intervals around empirical arm means, and
enforcing the constraint that any pair of arms with overlapping condence intervals are played with
equal probability: in particular, a fair no-regret algorithm can play uniformly at random amongst
the set of arms “chained” to the arm with highest upper condence bound by the condence
intervals, called the chained set X .
Denote the condence interval associated with arm i at round t by [`ti ,uti ]. Fix a set of condence
intervals at round t , [`t1,ut1], . . . , [`tk ,u
t
k ]. We say i is linked to j if [`
t
i ,u
t
i ] ∩ [`tj ,utj ] , ∅, and i is
chained to j if i and j are in the same component of the transitive closure of the linked relation. We
refer to the set of arms chained to the arm with highest upper condence bound as the chained set
X . We say the sequence of condence intervals are valid if, with probability 1 − δ , they contain the
true and empirical averages of every arm in every round.
In the absence of explicit knowledge of the sample means, the principal does not have sucient
information to incentivize uniformly random play amongst exactly the set of arms chained to the
arm with highest upper condence bound X 8. e principal does not know the empirical means of
the arms, and therefore cannot compute the arms contained in X directly.
e principal can, however, incentivize the myopic agent to play an arm j with a payment vector
pt such that ptj ≥ maxi pti + |maxi µˆti − µˆtj |. Unfortunately, the principal neither knows which arms
belong to X , nor how many arms are in X , nor how far apart the empirical means are in X . Instead,
the principal can maintain upper bounds on all of these quantities. Namely, the principal tracks a
superset of the chained set X , called the active set Xˆ . |Xˆ | will then act as an upper bound on the
size of the chained set, and |Xˆ | · xXˆ will upper bound the dierence between the highest arm mean
8Indeed, the ability to do so would contradict eorem 3.1 by acheiving sublinear regret with zero unfair rounds.
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and the lowest chained arm’s means, where xXˆ is the width of the largest condence interval of
any arm in Xˆ . By oering a payment of |Xˆ | · xXˆ to an arm selected uniformly from Xˆ (and zero for
all other arms), the principal will cause uniformly random play amongst Xˆ if all arms in Xˆ have
empirical means within |Xˆ | · xXˆ of the best empirical mean.
is is fair if in every round Xˆ = X : all means will then be within |Xˆ | · xXˆ by the denition of
chaining and xXˆ , and so this will induce uniformly random play amongst the chained set, exactly
the behavior shown to be fair in Joseph et al. [2016a]. On the other hand, if Xˆ \X , ∅, this behavior
could be unfair, either because not all arms within Xˆ have empirical means within |Xˆ | · xXˆ of one
another (i.e., not all arms in the set are chained together), or because some arms in Xˆ chain to other
arms outside of Xˆ , or because some arms in Xˆ are “below” arms outside of Xˆ . We will guarantee the
laer issues do not occur, by always ensuring Xˆ contains any arms “above” or chained to any arm
in Xˆ . e former issue (that some arms in Xˆ may not be chained to others in Xˆ , and their empirical
means may then not be close enough for the payment to change the myopic agent’s behavior in all
cases) cannot be entirely avoided. However, we can quickly discover if any arm in Xˆ has empirical
mean less than |Xˆ | · xXˆ below the best empirical mean: in O (Xˆ ) = O˜ (k ) rounds, that arm will be
oered the subsidy and it won’t change the agent’s decision. ose O˜ (k ) rounds will be unfair, as
are several rounds which follow this discovery and update the set Xˆ .
e following lemma, a generalization of the analysis of Joseph et al. [2016a], can be interpreted
to mean the following. Fix a deniton of condence intervals which are all valid over all rounds for
all arms with probability 1− δ . Consider any set of arms S which (a) contains the “upper chain” (all
arms chained to the arm with highest upper condence bound), (b) contains any arms “above” the
condence intervals of any arm in the set, and (c) is closed under chaining. en, playing uniformly
at random amongst S will satisfy contextual fairness.
Lemma 4.1. Suppose, with probability 1 − δ , at every round t and for every arm i , µti ∈ [`ti ,uti ].
Consider a set S of arms with the k ′ highest upper condence bounds for some k ′ < k . en, it is fair
to play uniformly at random over S ∪ {i chained to an arm in S }.
e pseudo-code in Figure 1 describes the payment scheme, which we analyze thereaer.
ALGORITHM 1: O (k2 ln kδ )-fair Payment Scheme
Function PlayAll (δ ,T )
x ← 1;
Xˆ ← {1, . . . ,k };
while t ≤ T do
(x , Xˆ ) ← ChainedFair(δ ,x , Xˆ );
end
Function ChainedFair (δ ,x , Xˆ )
Choose jt ∈UAR Xˆ ; // Pick arm to incentivize
x ← min(x ,ConfidenceWidth(δ , t ,minj ∈Xˆ ntj ));
Oer pt : ptjt = 4x · |X |,pti′,jt = 0;
it ← the myopic player’s choice;
if it , jt then
Xˆ ← FindChained(x , Xˆ , t );
end
return (x , Xˆ )
Function FindChained (x , Xˆ , t )
Oer pt = ~0;
it ← the myopic player’s choice;
R ← {it };
Oer pt = pt−1 + 2 · x ·∑i ∈Xˆ \R ei ;
while it ← the myopic player’s choice
and it < R do
R = R ∪ {it };
t ← t + 1;
Oer pt = pt−1 + 2 · x ·∑i ∈Xˆ \R ei
; // add 2 · x to payments of
arms in Xˆ not yet chosen
end
return R
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e performance of this payment scheme is summarized in the following theorem.
Theorem 4.2. For any δ , PlayAll is O (k2 ln(k/δ ))-fair, and has expected cost and regret
O *,k ·
∑
t
ConfidenceWidth(δ , t ,
t
k
)+- = O *,
√
k3T ln T
δ
+- .
We present the proof to this theorem aer stating several lemmas describing the behavior of
PlayAll. Observation 2 states that using x as a condence interval width for all arms in Xˆ yields
valid condence intervals. Hereaer, we use [`ti ,uti ] = [µˆti − x , µˆti + x] as valid condence intervals
for all i ∈ Xˆ , t ∈ [T ]. Lemma 4.3 shows that FindChained outputs a set which contains the upper
condence chain in its output round. Lemma 4.4 states that FindChained’s output is closed under
chaining (e.g., that every arm in its output is only chained to arms also belonging to the output
set) and contains all arms “above” any arms in its output. Lemma 4.5 argues that the empirical
means of every arm in the set output by FindChained are within 4 condence interval widths of
some other arm in the set. Lemma 4.6 shows that when this is the case (that the empirical means
are within 4x of each other, as is the case right aer a call to FindChained), that ChainedFair
induces uniformly random play amongst Xˆ . Lemma 4.7 upper-bounds the number of rounds before
which ChainedFair will discover when it is inducing unfair play. All proofs of these lemmas can
be found in Section A.
Observation 2. With probability 1 − δ , for all t ∈ [T ], i ∈ Xˆ t , µi ∈ [µˆti − x , µˆti + x].
Lemma 4.3. FindChained(x , Xˆ , t ) contains all arms chained to the arm with highest upper con-
dence bound in its output round t ′.
Lemma 4.4. Any arm chained to the set R = FindChained(x , Xˆ , t ) belongs to R. Moreover, any arm
i < R must have uti < mini′∈R `ti′ .
Lemma 4.5. Let t ′ be the round in which R = FindChained(x , Xˆ , t ′) outputs R. en, for any
j ∈ R = FindChained(x , Xˆ , t ′),
µˆt
′
j ≥ minj′∈R\{j } µˆ
t ′
j′ − 4 · x .
Moreover, maxj ∈R µˆt
′
j −minj ∈R µˆ
′t
j ≤ (2|R | + 2) · x .
Lemma 4.6. Suppose maxi, j ∈Xˆ |µˆti − µˆtj | ≤ 4|Xˆ | · x . en ChainedFair(δ , Xˆ ) induces uniformly
random play amongst Xˆ .
Lemma 4.7. Whenever there is an arm i such that maxj ∈Xˆ |µˆtj − µˆti | > 4|Xˆ | · x , with probability
1 − δ , FindChained will be called within O (k · ln(1/δ )) many rounds.
Proof of Theorem 4.2. We rst upper-bound the number of rounds in which PlayAll might
violate the fairness condition.
We argue iteratively about the set Xˆ : that (a) all arms chained to the top arm belong to Xˆ , and
(b) all arms chained to any arm in Xˆ belong to Xˆ . is is trivially true initially as Xˆ = {1, . . . ,k }. Xˆ
is only updated as the result of a call to FindChained. By Lemma 4.3, any arm chained to the top
arm will remain in Xˆ . Furthermore, by Lemma 4.4, any arm chained to an arm in its output also
belongs to its output. us, (a) and (b) hold for Xˆ for all rounds.
So, in rounds in which ChainedFair induces uniformly random play amongst Xˆ , (a) and (b) imply
ChainedFair satises the fairness condition. For any round in which maxi, j ∈Xˆ |µˆti − µˆtj | ≤ 2|Xˆ | · x ,
Lemma 4.6 implies ChainedFair induces uniformly random play amongst Xˆ . By Lemma 4.4, Xˆ
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contains any arms either above or chained to arms in Xˆ . us, Lemma 4.1 applies, and these rounds
are fair.
We now upper-bound the number of rounds for which ChainedFair does not induce uniformly
random play amongst Xˆ . For any particular i and round t such that maxj ∈Xˆ |µˆtj − µˆti | > 4|Xˆ | · x ,
Lemma 4.7 implies that this will be found inO (k ln(1/δ )) rounds, and FindChainedwill be called. In
any future round t ′ ≥ t , since the condence intervals are valid, we know that maxj ∈Xˆ |µˆt
′
j − µˆt
′
i | >
4( |Xˆ | − 2) · x , since either of the two means can change but by at most x each. Lemma 4.5
will return Xˆ such that maxi, j ∈Xˆ |µˆti − µˆtj | ≤ (2|Xˆ | + 2) · x . us, as |Xˆ | ≥ 2, then arm i will
be removed at the rst round in which it was the impetus for FindChained to be called as
maxi, j ∈Xˆ |µˆt
′
j − µˆt
′
i | ≤ 2( |Xˆ | + 2) · x ≤ 4( |Xˆ | − 2) · x < maxj ∈Xˆ |µˆtj − µˆti |, a contradiction if i ∈ Xˆ .
Since x is non-increasing, so is Xˆ : thus, at most k calls to FindChained are made. us, the total
number of unfair rounds is equal to the number of rounds in which maxi, j ∈Xˆ |µˆti − µˆtj | > 4|Xˆ | ·x plus
the number of rounds in FindChained. e former is bounded by O (k2 ln(k/δ )) (With probability
1 − δ/k it will take at most O (k ln(k/δ )) rounds of unfair play before FindChained is called when
this is the case, and each call will reduce the size of Xˆ so it can be called at most k times. In total, this
bound holds for all k rounds with probability 1− δ .); the laer byO (k2) (each call of FindChained
uses O (k ) rounds, and there are at most O (k ) calls to FindChained).
We now upper-bound the cost of this payment scheme and the regret of the agent. In the
O (k2 ln(k/δ )) unfair rounds, the payments might be Ω(1); similarly, the regret of the algorithm in
those rounds might be Ω(1). In all other rounds, the myopic agent is playing uniformly at random
amongst a set of arms whose true means are within 2k · x of the best true mean, so 2k · x in each
fair round is an upper-bound on per-round regret. e maximum payment oered in any round is
4k · x as well, so that also upper bounds the cost. e overall upper bound follows from some basic
algebra and the fact that each arm in Xˆ will have been played Ω˜
(
t
k
)
times in round t . 
5 CONTEXTUAL SETTINGWITH PARTIAL INFORMATION:
LINEAR PAYMENTS OR UNFAIR ROUNDS
In this section, we argue that the partial information model is much harder in the linear contextual
case — in every round that the principal does not pay Ω(1), an adversary can force the myopic agent
to behave unfairly. is implies that on an adversarially chosen instance, every round is either
unfair or has constant cost: thus, either the sum of the payments must be Ω(T ), or the number
of unfair rounds must be Ω(T ), or both. is rules out positive results in the partial information
model of the sort we were able to obtain in the classic bandits seing. In the following, we assume
that the myopic agent is using an ordinary least squares estimator, for simplicity. Identical results
can also be proven for other natural estimators, like ridge regression estimators.
Theorem 5.1. Suppose k ≥ 3. Consider any payment scheme in the partial information model in
the linear contextual bandit seing. For any η ∈ (0, 1), there is an instance for which with probability
1 − δ , in every round, either the round is unfair, or the expected cost for the principal is k−1k · (1 − η).
e proof of the theorem relies on the fact that the principal cannot observe the adversarially
chosen contexts; the expected rewards in any round then can be (almost) arbitrary. In the classic
case, it was only in the rst unpeaked round that we had the freedom to design our lower bound
instance arbitrarily – aer that, the principal would have learned some information about the
instance, and hence the payment distribution could be a function of the instance. In the linear
contextual case, we have sucient freedom to design a lower bound instance at -every- round.
Although the principal may have learned a great deal about the underlying linear functions, she by
denition has no information about the realized contexts at the current round, which we use to our
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advantage. As in the classic seing, in any round where the payment scheme is not peaked, the
largest payment is strictly less than 1 larger than the other payments with probability more than
zero. We will use this to construct an instance over which there is constant probability (over the
history) that the myopic agent chooses an unfair distribution over arms. Additional complications
arise from the fact that the principal learns about the instance from the set of previous unfair rounds
(which, in the classic case, we did not have, since we only argued there had to be a single unfair
round if the payment scheme was not peaked). We circumvent this problem by arguing that the
principal must deploy a peaked distribution to be fair, even if the principal knows everything about
the instance I and even if the principal knows the empirical estimates θˆ ti for all t ∈ [T ], i ∈ [k].
Proof. Consider the one-dimensional case, where θi ∈ R≥0. We construct an instance I such
that even for a principal who has full information about I , and θˆ ti for all t ′ ≤ t , i , in order to
guarantee that the payment distribution in round t is fair for any set of arriving contexts x t , the
largest payment must be at least 1 − η with probability k−1k . is clearly holds for any round
in which a peaked payment distribution is used, and so for the remainder, we assume that the
distribution in round t is not peaked.
Let θi = 1 − η ∈ (0, 1) for all i , and let arm 1 have deterministic rewards equal to their mean, so
that θ1x t1 = x t1 for all t . Because the rewards are deterministic and the agent is using an ordinary
least squares estimator, the myopic agent’s prediction θˆ t1 = θ t1 as well for all t . For all i , 1, let
Dti,x ti = U [θix
t
i −ϵ,θix ti +ϵ] for some very small ϵ . Pr ti ∼Dti,xti [r
t
i > θix
t
i ] =
1
2 = Pr ti ∼Dti,xti
[r ti < θix ti ]:
the rewards drawn from these distributions have the right expectation but are always larger or
smaller than their expectation, and each with equal probability. en, again by properties of the
ordinary least squares estimator, this will imply that with probability 12 over observations, in
any round t and for any i ∈ [k] \ {1}, θˆ ti > θ ti , and with probability 12 , θˆ ti < θ ti , for any round t .
Furthermore, with probability 1, in every round t , every empirical estimate of the coecients is
distinct: θˆ ti , θˆ tj for all i , j ∈ [k].
We begin by arguing that every coordinate i must have equal probability of receiving the largest
payment in any round t if the round is to be fair (with probability 1 − δ over the history). Precisely,
x some history ht , and let
di = Pp∼γ t (ht )[i wins with payment vector p,x ti = ~0,∀i |ht ].
Since for all i ∈ [k] and any ht , θi · x ti = 0, it must be that di = 1k for all i if round t is fair for this ht .
We have assumed the payment scheme is not peaked in round t , conditioned on some particular
history ht . us,
Pp∼γ t (ht )[max
i
pi −max
j,i
pj ≥ 1] < 1.
We argue that round t must be unfair conditioned on ht or that with probability k−1k , maxi pi ≥ 1−η.
Let
c = sup
c
: Pp∼γ t (ht )[max
i
pi −max
j,i
pj ≥ c] = 1;
we again know that some such c ≥ 0 must exist, and that c < 1 because the payment scheme is
unpeaked. Let arm i have the largest empirical coecient: θˆ t
i
> maxi′,i θˆ ti′ in round t and arm i
have the smallest empirical coecient, θˆ ti < mini′,i θˆ ti′ . Further dene
ci′ = sup
c
: Pp∼γ t ( ·)[pi′ − pi ≥ c |pi′ ≥ maxi′′,i′ pi′′] = 1,
e.g. that ci′ is the margin by which i ′ has payment larger than arm i when i ′ has largest payment.
Note ci′ ∈ [0, 1] for all i ′. Let imax ∈ argmaxi′ ci′ be an arm with largest payment margin over i and
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imin = argmini′ci′ be the arm with the smallest payment margin over i . We consider three cases:
when cimax > 1− η, when 1− η ≥ cimax > cimin , and when 1− η ≥ cimax = cimin . In each case, we show
that either the largest payment is at least 1 − η with probability at least k−1k , or the round is unfair.
Case 1: cimax > 1 − η. We claim here that either cimin > 1 − η or the round is unfair: this will
imply that with probability k−1k , maxi pi ≥ 1 − η. Suppose the round is fair. Consider the context
x t
i
=
1−η
θˆ t
i
and x ti′ = 0 for all i
′ , i . en, θˆ t
i
x t
i
= 1 − η, and θˆ ti x ti = 0 = θix ti for all other i . Fairness
will imply that all i , 1 should be played with equal probability. Notice that imax is played with
probability 1k : precisely when imax has the largest payment (which must be largest by cimax > 1 − η).
imin wins only when her payment is largest (which happens with probability 1k ) and larger than i’s
by at least 1 − η. So, if pi timin |ht = pi timax |ht = 1k , it must be that cimin ≥ 1 − η.
Case 2: 1 − η ≥ cimax > cimin . We argue that the round must be unfair if cimax > cimin .
Choose contexts x ti such that θˆ ti x
t
i
= cimax ≤ 1−η and x ti′ = 0 for all other i ′. en, since θix ti = 0
for all i , i , if this round is to be fair, all arms i , i must be played with equal probability. Arm imax
wins whenever it has the largest payment, since pimax ≥ pi + cimax whenever imax has the largest
payment. erefore imax wins with probability 1k .
imin, on the other hand, wins only when they have the largest payment and beat i’s payment
by cimax > cimin , which happens with strictly less probability than imin having largest payment
(probability 1k ) by the denition of cimin . So, imin wins with probability strictly less than that of imax;
this round must be unfair.
Case 3: 1 − η ≥ cimax = cimin . In this case, ca = cb = β for all a,b ∈ [k] \ {i}. If β ≥ 1 − η, the claim
holds (the largest payment is at least 1 − η with probability at least k−1k , so assume β < 1 − η.
Suppose β > 0. We exhibit a set of contexts for which this payment scheme combined with the
agent is unfair. Fix some D ∈ (β, 1 − η); dene the contexts
• x t
i
: θˆ t
i
x t
i
= D > β
• x tj : θˆ tj x tj = D − β > 0 for j the arm with second-largest empirical coecient,
• x ti′ = x tj for all i ′ < {i, j}.
en, θˆ ti′x
t
i′ < θˆ
t
j x
t
j , and so arm j is played whenever j has the largest payment, since j (and all
other arms) has margin over i of at least β when they have the largest payment; thus j is played
with probability 1k . Since θ jx
t
j = θi′x
t
i′ for all i
′ , i , if this round is fair, each i ′ must also be played
with probability 1k , in particular for i
′ with smallest θˆ ti′ . However, θˆ
t
i′x
t
i′ < D − β ; i ′ can only win if
her payment is the largest and it beats the payment of i by strictly more than β , which happens
with probability strictly less than 1k by denition of β . us i
′ cannot win with probability as large
as j and so round t is unfair if ca = cb = β > 0 for all a,b , i .
Finally, we consider the case where β = 0 and separately argue that this round cannot be fair.
e contexts x ti′ = 1 for all i
′ should prove this: arm i will be played with probability 1k (precisely
the probability that i gets the weakly largest payment), but arms with smaller empirical means will
need to have the largest payment by some margin, which happens with strictly less probability
than them having the largest payment by the denition of β , so they win with probability less than
1
k , meaning fairness is violated in this round, since θix
t
i
= 1 − η = θi′x ti′ . 
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6 FULL INFORMATION: PERFECT FAIRNESS WITH SUBLINEAR PAYMENTS
In this section, we show that a principal with full information about the state of a myopic agent can
design a payment scheme which is fair in every round and has sublinear cost for both the classic
and linear contextual bandits problems. is contrasts with the partial information model, where
for k ≥ 3 arms, in both the classic and linear contextual seings, in which there must be unfair
rounds for any payment scheme with total cost o(T ).
Roughly, the fair payment scheme operates as follows. In each round, the scheme knows the
empirical estimates of rewards used by the myopic agent. Moreover, the scheme can compute
condence intervals around these estimates (the scheme knows how many times each arm was
pulled, and, in a contextual seing, the contexts for each previous choice). In such a round, the
payment scheme then will choose an arm i uniformly at random from the set of arms chained to
the arm with highest upper condence bound, and oer a payment for choosing i equal to the
dierence between the empirical estimate of i’s reward and the empirical estimate of the highest
reward in that round. is induces uniformly random play amongst the top set of arms, and by
Lemma 4.1, this will be a fair distribution.
We now present the pseudocode in Figure 2 a parametrized family of payment schemes de-
scribed informally above. A payment scheme in this family is instantiated by giving a method of
constructing valid condence intervals around myopic predictions.
ALGORITHM 2: A Fair Full Information Payment Scheme
Function Fair-Payments(δ ,T )
Xˆ ← {1, . . . ,k };
while t ≤ T do
it = argmaxi µˆti t ;
Let Xˆ t = {i chained to it by δ -valid condence intervals from round t };
Choose jt ∈UAR Xˆ ;
; // Pick an arm in the upper chain to incentivize
Oer pt : ptjt = µˆ
t
i t − µˆtjt ,pti′,jt = 0;
end
Theorem 6.1. Consider an instance of Fair-Payments(δ ,T ) instantiated with condence intervals
[`ti ,uti ] such that µˆti =
uti −`ti
2 , and with probability 1 − δ , for all i ∈ [k], t ∈ [T ], µti ∈ [`ti ,uti ]. en,
Fair-Payments(δ ,T ) is fair at every round, and has cost and regret O (k
∑
t w (t ) + δT ), wherew (t ) is
the maximum width of any condence interval in the top chained set.
Before proving eorem 6.1, we mention that this theorem, when combined with standard
methods of constructing condence intervals, implies the existence of fair payment schemes with
sublinear cost and regret, both in the classic and linear contextual seings.
Corollary 6.2. Consider the classic bandits problem. en, Fair-Payments(δ ,T ) using the con-
dence interval for arm i introduced by ConfidenceWidth(δ ,T ,nti ) is fair and has cost and regret
O (
√
k3T ln kTδ ).
Proof. By Lemma 3.4, with probability 1 − δ , these condence intervals are all valid for all
t ∈ [T ], i ∈ [k]. So, eorem 6.1 applies, and states that this payment scheme is fair, and has regret
O (k ·∑t w (t )), wherew (t ) is the maximum width of any arm in the active set at round t . Since the
chained set is monotone, at round t every arm in the chained set has been chained for t rounds.
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erefore, in expectation each arm in the chain has been pulled tk times. An additive Cherno
bound implies that any particular arm has, with probability at least 1 − δ2kt 2 , been pulled in round t
at least tk −
√
t ln
(
2t2k
δ
)
2 times, and so this bound holds for all rounds and all arms with probability
at lest 1 − δ2 summing up over all k arms and all t . en, by Lemma 3 in Joseph et al. [2016a], we
know thatw (t ) ≤ 2
√
ln((pi t )2/3δ )
2 tk −
√
t ln
(
2kt2
δ
)
2
. Summing over all t we have the desired result. 
Corollary 6.3. Consider the linear contextual bandits problem. Suppose the myopic agent uses
a ridge regression estimator: θˆ ti =
(
XTi Xi + λI
)−1
XTi Yi , where Xi ,Yi are the design matrices and
observations before round t . en, dene
wti = | |x ti | |(XTi Xi+λI )−1 (m
√
d ln 1 + t/λ
δ
+
√
λ,
and
`ti = 〈θˆ ti ,x ti 〉 −wti , uti = 〈θˆ ti ,x ti 〉 +wti .
en, Fair-Payments(δ ,T ) is fair and has cost and regret O
(
md
√
k3T ln2 T 2kdλδ
)
.
Proof. e analysis in the proof ofeorem 2 of Joseph et al. [2016b] shows that these condence
intervals are valid with probability 1 − δ . eir analysis upper-bounds k ∑t w (t ) wherew (t ) is the
largest width of any condence interval in the chained set in round t , by
O
(
md
√
k3T ln2 T
2k
dλδ
)
.
us, the resulting algorithm is fair, and the bounds on cost and regret follow fromeorem 6.1. 
We now proceed with the proof of eorem 6.1.
Proof. We begin by proving that Fair-Payments(δ ,T ) is fair in every round. By assumption,
with probability 1 − δ , for all i ∈ [k], t ∈ [T ], µti ∈ [`ti ,uti ]. us it follows from Lemma 4.1 that it
suces to show that these payments suce to induce uniformly random play amongst the set of
arms chained to the arm with upper condence bound. By denition, the top chain in round t is
exactly Xˆ t . e distribution over payments in round t chooses each jt ∈ Xˆ t with probability 1|Xˆ t |
and accordingly a pt such that ptjt = µˆ
t
i t − µˆtjt and pti′ = 0. is induces the myopic agent to choose
jt in all such cases. us, each jt ∈ Xˆ t is chosen by the myopic agent with probability 1|Xˆ t | . So,
Fair-Payments(δ ,T ) is fair.
Condition on all condence intervals being valid. e myopic agent under this payment scheme
chooses uniformly at random from the top chain, which has regret in round t bounded by∑i ∈Xˆ t uti −
`ti ≤ kw (t ), wherew (t ) = maxi ∈Xˆ t uti − `ti . us, in total, the regret is upper bounded by k
∑
t w (t ).
Moreover, the payment in round t is µˆti t − µˆtjt ≤ uti t − `tjt ≤
∑
i ∈Xˆ t u
t
i − `ti ≤ kw (t ), and so the same
bound holds for the cost of the payment scheme. With probability δ , the widths of the condence
intervals could be arbitrary, as could the inaccuracy of the sampled means. An additive δT bounds
the additional expected regret. 
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7 CONCLUSION AND OPEN QUESTIONS
Our interest in this paper is the information that a principal needs to have about the environment
before he can cost-eectively incentivize a short-sighted agent to behave “fairly.” We focus on
two information models: the partial information model—when the principal can only observe the
decisions the agent made, but not their rewards (or, in the contextual case, the contexts informing
those actions), and the full information model, where the principal observes everything the agent
does. In the full information model, it is possible to have it all—the principal can with sub-linear
total cost incentivize the agent to play fairly at every round, and obtain no regret. In the partial
information model, things are more dicult. However, despite showing the impossibility of non-
trivially guaranteeing fairness at every round in the classic seing, we show that with sub-linear
payments, the principal can incentivize that all but a constant number of rounds are fair, and that
the agent obtains a no-regret guarantee. In the linear contextual bandit seing, our results in the
partial information model are strongly negative—it is not possible to obtain a sub-linear number of
unfair rounds with sub-linear payments. ere are many open questions, but here we mention two
that we nd particularly interesting:
(1) Our bounds (both upper and lower) in the linear contextual bandit seing are for adversari-
ally selected contexts. In the natural case in which contexts are drawn from an (unknown)
probability distribution, it may still be possible to obtain positive results in the partial
information seing, analogous to the results we obtain for the classic bandits problem.
However, our upper bound technique from the classic case does not directly extend to the
linear contextual case even when there is a distribution over contexts.
(2) e friction to fairness here is that the agent in question has a short horizon for which he is
optimizing. We study the extreme case in which he is entirely myopic. How do our results
extend in the case in which the agent is not completely myopic, but is instead optimizing
with respect to some xed discount factor bounded away from 1?
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A MISSING PROOFS
Proof of Theorem 3.5. First, we will show that the payment scheme will incentivize the agent
to select the arms fairly over all rounds with probability (1 − δ ) over the realization of the history.
By Lemma 3.4, we know that with probability at least 1 − δ over the realizations of the rewards, for
all rounds t and both arms i ,
|µˆti − µi | <
ConfidenceWidth(δ , t ,nti )
2 . (4)
We will condition on this event for the remainder of the argument. Note that in each round
t , there are two cases. In the rst case, the empirical mean rewards of the two arms satisfy
|µˆt1 − µˆt2 | < p (δ , t ,nt1,nt2). en the arm will be selected uniformly at random, so the algorithm is
fair.
In the second case, the empirical mean rewards satisfy |µˆt1 − µˆt2 | ≥ p (δ , t ,nt1,nt2). Without loss of
generality, let us assume µˆt1 > µˆt2 , so the algorithm will deterministically always play arm 1. en it
follows from (4) and the denition of p (δ , t ,nt1,nt2) that the true mean rewards µ1 > µ2. erefore,
the algorithm is fair in this case (and also in all future rounds).
Next, we will bound the total expected payment made by the principal. As a rst step, we can
show that with probability at least (1−1/T ) that, no arm is played for more than 2 logT consecutive
times. en we can bound the total payment as follows:
E

T∑
t=1
p (δ , t ,nt1,n
t
2)
 = E

T∑
t=1
(
ConfidenceWidth(δ , t ,nt1) + ConfidenceWidth(δ , t ,nt2)
)
≤ (1 − 1/T ) *,4 log(T )
T∑
t=1
ConfidenceWidth(δ , t , t )+- + (1/T )T O (log(T /δ ))
= O
(√
T ln2 (T /δ )
)
Finally, we will bound the expected cumulative regret incurred by the algorithm. Without loss of
generality, we will assume µ1 > µ2 and let ∆ = µ1 − µ2 be the dierence between the mean expected
rewards. e algorithm incurs an expected regret of ∆ whenever it plays the arm 2. It suces to
bound the number of times arm 2 is played.
Note that the algorithm will stop playing arm 2 if at some round t ,
ConfidenceWidth(δ , t ,nt1)
2 ,
ConfidenceWidth(δ , t ,nt2)
2 ≤ ∆/3
is will require the algorithm to play both arms S = O
( ln(T /δ )
∆2
)
number of times. By applying
Cherno bounds, we know that with probability at least (1− 1/T ), it suces to have t ≥ O (S ). is
will allow us to upper bound the expected regret by
(1 − 1/T )∆O
(
ln(T /δ )
∆2
)
+T (1/T ) = O
(
ln(T /δ )
∆
)
Also note that the expected regret is also trivially upper bounded by ∆T , so the expected regret is
no more than
min{O
(
ln(T /δ )
∆
,∆T
)
} ≤ O
(√
T ln(T /δ )
)
,
where the inequality follows from the fact that min{a,b} ≤ √ab for any a,b > 0. 
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Proof of Observation 2. By Lemma 4.1, the width of the condence intervals produce by
ConfidenceWidth have this property in all rounds. Since x is dened to be the either an
“old” value of the output of ConfidenceWidth (in which case the validity of the denition
of ConfidenceWidth’s condence widths gives us this guarantee), or the largest output of
ConfidenceWidth for some i ∈ Xˆ t , this property continues to hold. 
Proof of Lemma 4.3. We prove this iteratively over all inputs and outputs of FindChained.
e input to the rst call to FindChained is Xˆ = [k], so this is trivially true. Now, suppose the
upper chain is included in the input Xˆ to FindChained: we will argue that it continues to be
included in the output R = FindChained(x , Xˆ , t ). We actually prove something stronger: any arm
in the input Xˆ will be in R if its empirical mean in the output round t ′ is within 2x of anything in
R’s empirical mean in round t ′, and that the arm with highest upper condence bound in round t ′
is in R. ese two together imply R contains the upper chain. Let Rt = ∅,Rt+` = the set R in round
t + ` before R is output by FindChained, so Rt ′ = R.
Note that Rt+1 = {i0} where i0 is the arm with highest empirical mean in Xˆ with highest empirical
mean at round t . en, either Rt+2 = {i0} and no arm has empirical mean within 2x of i0 in round
t + 1 or Rt+2 = {i0, i1} for i1 ∈ Xˆ such that µˆt+1i1 ≥ µˆt+1i0 − 2x . More generally, in round t + ` < t ′, an
arm was added in round t + ` − 1, and another arm will be added in round t + ` if if some empirical
mean in Xˆ is within 2x of any arm already belonging to R = {i0, i1, . . . , it+`−1}, since the payments
for any arm in Xˆ but not R increases by 2x in this round. us, every arm which is not in the output
R must be more than 2x away from any arm in the output R in round t ′.
We argue now that the arm with highest upper condence bound in round t ′ belongs to R. Since
Xˆ contained the upper chain in round t by assumption, it in particular contains the arm with the
highest upper condence in round t ′. us, it suces to argue that R contains the arm in Xˆ with
highest upper condence bound in round t ′. Either arm i0 or some arm with empirical mean within
2x of i0 at round t ′ must be the arm with highest upper condence bound in round t ′ amongst
those arms in Xˆ , since x is an upper bound on the width of the condence intervals of the set of
arms in Xˆ , and by the previous argument, R contains every arm whose empirical mean in round t ′
is within 2x of i0’s mean. 
Proof of Lemma 4.4. We rst prove the rst claim. is is true for the rst input to Find-
Chained: we argue that for any input Xˆ which contains every arm chained to an arm in Xˆ ,
R = FindChained(x , Xˆ , t ) contains any arm chained to an arm in R. So, suppose Xˆ contains every
arm chained to an arm in Xˆ . By the argument used in the proof of Lemma 4.3, any arm with an
empirical mean within 2x of any arm in R’s empirical mean in round t ′ belongs to R. So, any arm
linked to an arm in R must belong to R and therefore so must any arm chained to R.
Now, we argue that for any arm i < R must have uti < mini′∈R `ti′ . is is true for the rst input
to FindChained (the entire set [k] is the initial input). We argue that conditioned on this holding
for a particular input to FindChained, the output from FindChained will also satisfy this claim.
Notice that every arm in i ′ ∈ R was incentivized to be played during this call to FindChained, and
those arms no longer in R were not, which means their empirical means were more than 2x away
from any arm ultimately in R; that for i < R, µˆti + 2x < mini′∈R µˆti′ . us, since `
t
j = µˆ
t
j − x and
utj = µˆ
t
j + x for all j ∈ Xˆ , the claim follows. 
Proof of Lemma 4.5. e empirical mean of any arm in the output of FindChained had to be
within 2x of some arm in R when it was input. ose empirical means might change (each mean by
at most x , since the condence intervals are valid, by Observation 2), so the empirical dierences
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might change by 2 · x , but the total dierence between these two arms is then increased by at most
2x . us, summing up these distances gives the second claim. 
Proof of Lemma 4.6. Oering payment of 4x |Xˆ | for arm i ′ and payment 0 for all other arms j in
round t will cause a myopic agent to choose i if maxi ∈{k } µˆti −µˆti′ ≤ 4|Xˆ | ·x . us, if argmaxi ∈{k } µˆti ∈
Xˆ , each i ′ ∈ Xˆ will be played with equal probability by construction of the payment vectors used
in ChainedFair. Lemma 4.3 implies the top chain and therefore the top arm are contained in Xˆ ,
thus, the claim holds. 
Proof of Lemma 4.7. With probability 1|Xˆ | ≥ 1k , arm it selected by ChainedFair for payment
4x · |Xˆ |. Since maxj ∈Xˆ |µˆtj − µˆti | > 4|Xˆ | · x , the myopic agent will prefer the arm with highest mean,
and his choice will therefore cause FindChained to be called. e probability that such an arm it
is not called for k log(1/δ ) consecutive rounds is at most δ . 
